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I. INTRODUCTION
For thirteen years, pop icon Britney Spears has been under
a conservatorship of both her person and her estate. 1 Under
California law, her father Jamie Spears completely controlled her
assets, estate, business affairs, and personal life 2 until he was
removed from her conservatorship on September 29, 2021. 3 After
years of abuse and an incredibly popular social media movement
dedicated to #FreeBritney, the world heard about Britney Spears’
conservatorship in her own words on June 23, 2021. 4 The pop star
recounted a humiliating chain of abuses, including the loss of
financial freedom, and forcible sterilization through an intrauterine
device that she is not allowed to remove. 5 The singer’s
1
See Jon Caramanica, Britney Spears Takes On Her Conservatorship,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/01/arts/music/popcast-britney-spearsconservatorship.html [https://perma.cc/992C-WRCJ].
2
See Heather Swadley, 3 Disturbing Truths About Mental Health We
Can Learn From the #FreeBritney Saga, THE FINANCIAL DIET (June 29, 2021),
https://thefinancialdiet.com/3-disturbing-truths-about-money-mental-health-wecan-learn-from-the-freebritney-saga/ [https://perma.cc/X6AX-KJZP]; see also
Krystie Lee Yandoli, Here’s a Timeline of How Britney Spears Got to This
Point in Her Conservatorship, BUZZFEED (June 23, 2021, 5:52 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/krystieyandoli/britney-spearsconservatorship-timeline [https://perma.cc/ND7F-NZUV].
3
See Stephanie K. Baer, Britney Spears Is Finally Free From Her
Father's Control After More Than 13 Years, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 29, 2021,
8:38 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/skbaer/britney-spears-freejamie-conservatorship [https://perma.cc/27P8-UK98] (Jamie Spears had
previously stepped down from the guardianship in August); see also Anastasia
Tsioulcas, Jamie Spears Agrees to Step Down From Britney Spears
Conservatorship, NPR (Aug. 12, 2021, 6:27 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/08/12/1027223521/jamie-spears-steps-down-britneyspears-conservatorship [https://perma.cc/D2CN-JULM].
4
See Yandoli, supra note 2.
5
Stephanie K. Baer, Britney Spears Asked a Judge to End the

2

conservatorship was only recently terminated after a change in legal
counsel 6 and a lengthy legal battle. 7 Britney’s treatment rightfully
shocks and dismays the world. Yet, Britney’s case mirrors the ways
in which the legal system fails disabled people 8 more generally. As
National Women’s Law Center attorney Ma’ayan Anafi stated:
“What’s different is that Spears has a platform to share it with the
world.” 9
Disabled people—especially people with intellectual and
developmental disabilities and mental-health disabilities—routinely
face paternalism in the legal system. Non-disabled persons are
presumed legally competent once they reach the age of majority. 10
Conservatorship That Sparked the #FreeBritney Movement, BUZZFEED (June
23, 2021, 6:52 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/skbaer/britneyspears-conservatorship-hearing [https://perma.cc/P5ZG-56ZJ].
6
Joe Coscarelli et al., Britney Spears Can Hire a New Lawyer of Her
Choice, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/14/arts/music/britney-spearsconservatorship-lawyer.html [https://perma.cc/UY7T-88UX].
7
Anastasia Tsioulcas, Britney Spears’ conservatorship has finally
ended, NPR (Nov. 12, 2021, 5:16 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/11/12/1054860726/britney-spears-conservatorshipended [https://perma.cc/3485-PLGT].
8
I make the deliberate decision in this project to generally use
“identity-first” as opposed to “person-first” language, i.e., disabled people, not
people with disabilities. Although individual disabled persons and different
disability communities differ in terms of preference, there is a strong case to be
made that the arguments behind “person-first” language are flawed. First, many
disabled persons view their disability as a major aspect of their identity, and
thus, distancing disabled persons from their disability linguistically may be
inimical to the process of self-identification for disabled persons. Second, the
implicit assumption behind “person-first” language is that there is something
dehumanizing about acknowledging that someone is disabled. This reinforces
the problematic and pervasive narrative that disabilities are deficiencies in
personhood or that having a disability makes someone less human. Therefore,
for political reasons, I use the category disabled person; however, I
acknowledge that the decision about how to self-identify as disabled is
contentious and the prerogative of individual disabled people.
9
Emily Shugerman, Shocked by Britney’s Forced IUD? Here’s Why
You Shouldn’t Be, THE DAILY BEAST (June 25, 2021, 3:37 AM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/britney-spears-forced-iud-is-common-inconservatorships [https://perma.cc/6ZQJ-MDU5].
10
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP: TOWARD
ALTERNATIVES THAT PROMOTE GREATER SELF-DETERMINATION 15 (2018)
[hereinafter BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP].
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Once a person reaches the age of eighteen, they may freely make
major life decisions such as where to live or to contract without legal
intervention—even if these decisions are not in the person’s “best
interest.” 11 However, for persons the law deems incapacitated,
usually on the basis of mental disability, the law implements a
double standard. 12 For adults under guardianship, third parties may
make all manners of decisions in pursuit of the disabled party’s
perceived best interest. 13
Disabled people were once placed in abusive institutions
under the guise of their “best interest.” 14 Yet, even in a “postinstitutionalization” 15 era, disabled people are routinely denied
basic rights such as parenthood on the basis of their perceived best
interest and the perceived best interest of their children. 16 Disabled
people can be forcibly medicated and involuntarily committed in
pursuit of their best interests. 17 Disabled people can be denied the
right to choose their own sexual partners. 18 Moreover, disabled
people are moreover often denied the right to choose where they
live or work—they are funneled into nursing homes or sheltered

11

Id.
See Lucy Series, Relationships, Autonomy and Legal Capacity:
Mental Capacity and Support Paradigms, 40 INT’L J. L. PSYCH. 80, 80–81
(2015).
13
Id. at 80.
14
See, e.g., DENNIS B. DOWNEY & JAMES W. CONROY, PENNHURST
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS 5 (2020) (“Once thought to be
progressive training facilities, institutions like Pennhurst became a nightmare, or
a kind of ‘purgatory’ for the oppressed, the epitome of what was wrong in failed
public policy in the treatment of individuals with mental disabilities.”).
15
It is important to note that institutionalization continues despite the
end of mass, state-sanctioned institutionalization. For instance, 14.5% of
nursing home residents in New York are under 65, suggesting that many longterm residents are disabled rather than aging. See Younger people are
increasingly trapped in nursing homes, CENTER FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS
(accessed Sept. 19, 2021), https://cdrnys.org/blog/news/younger-people-areincreasingly-trapped-in-nursing-homes/ [https://perma.cc/B937-98EF].
16
See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE:
ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN
39–40 (2012).
17
See Lucy Series, supra note 12, at 83.
18
Id. at 84.
12
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workshops by default. 19
The legal community has been instrumental in guaranteeing
fundamental rights of self-determination for some disabled
people. 20 However, lawyers are often complicit in ableist
practices—in fact, our 21 ethical rules sometimes require it. 22 Rule
1.14 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”)
provides that lawyers may supplement their own judgment for a
disabled client’s when they think it is in their client’s interest. 23 In
Britney Spears’s case, her former attorney repeatedly undermined
her attempts to end her conservatorship, 24 likely based on his
mistaken belief that doing so would not be in the singer’s best
interest. Indeed, her attorney did not even inform her that ending her
conservatorship was an option. 25
This paper considers the ethical obligations of attorneys
when interacting with disabled clients, arguing that the Model Rules
should be altered to reflect the idea of “support-based” legal
capacity embedded in the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities and becoming popularized within the
disability community. Support-based models prioritize the
expressed preferences of disabled people. 26
Section II contextualizes this discussion within broader
19

See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Brett M.
Kavanaugh to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 531–32 (2018) (statement
of Elizabeth “Liz” Weintraub, Advocacy Specialist, Association of University
Centers on Disabilities, Silver Spring, Maryland).
20
See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999)
(holding that the anti-discrimination provision in Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act sometimes requires that people with mental disabilities be
placed in community settings rather than institutions).
21
I use the “editorial we” and terms such as “ours” to demonstrate
broad social ownership of the collective anxiety surrounding disability. Because
ableism is such a pervasive apparatus, a disavowal of disability anxiety is
impossible for anyone, disabled or nondisabled, or anywhere between.
22
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
23
See id.
24
Joe Coscarelli et al., Britney Spears’s Courtroom Plea Spurs
Questions for Her Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/arts/music/britney-spears-lawyer-samuelingham.html [https://perma.cc/9VUZ-AVKS].
25
Id.
26
See Lucy Series, supra note 12, at 83.
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conversations about capacity and human rights law. Section III
compares the Model Rules with the standards set out by the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Section IV
discusses the practical implications of these differences through two
hypotheticals. This paper concludes by proposing a new Model Rule
1.14 to bring the Model Rules in line with international human
rights law and the needs of the disability community.
II.

DEBATES REGARDING CAPACITY AND DISABILITY RIGHTS

Disabled people have historically been denied their legal
decision-making abilities through substituted decision-making or
even forcible institutionalization. 27 Other people make important
life decisions for disabled people, and this is facilitated by the U.S.
legal system. 28 This section outlines the challenge to this approach
exemplified by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities. Section II.A discusses capacity-based conceptions of
legal personhood, and Section II.B provides an alternative
framework for understanding legal capacity. Section II.C outlines
the disconnects between American disability law and the standards
set forth by the Convention.
A. Capacity-Based Models of Legal Personhood
Legal personhood—which determines the scope of rights
and duties under the law—is traditionally predicated on capacity. 29
The most prized form of legal personality is the responsible subject,
who is responsible because they are “rational.” 30 The responsible
subject can sue and be sued, vote, hold property, and is generally
granted the corresponding rights and duties of citizenship. 31
However, the responsible subject is imagined as a subject who
possesses a full range of capacities. 32 Under capacity-based ideas of
personhood, if a person is deemed to lack “mental capacity,” third
27

See supra notes 14–19.
Id.
29
See Lucy Series, supra note 12, at 80.
30
Ngaire Naffine, Who are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to
Responsible Subjects, 66 MOD. L. REV. 346, 362–65 (2003).
31
See id.
32
See Lucy Series, supra note 12, at 81.
28
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parties may be given substantial latitude to make decisions on their
behalf—to further their perceived “best interest.” 33
Capacity-based ideas of legal personality treat capacity as a
fixed quantity that courts and mental health professionals can
measure. 34 Incapacity justifies paternalistic interventions in the
lives of disabled persons, such as guardianship laws that implement
substitute decision-making. 35 The guardian acts as the legal
representative of the disabled person. 36 Guardians may control
some or all of the decisions in a person’s life, including control of
financial, health care, voting, marriage, socializing, and
employment decisions. 37 Britney Spears, for example, was under
both a guardianship of her estate and her person, giving her guardian
substantial power over her everyday decisions. 38 Although ethical
guidelines ostensibly exist to promote well-being and selfdetermination, many people under guardianship experience
vulnerability as the result of the absolute power vested in another
person by guardianship law. 39 Guardians frequently abuse their
power. 40
It is easy to suggest that people who lack mental capacity
ought to be subject to substitute decision-making because of their
profound disabilities. However, capacity itself is contentious. The
idea of mental capacity itself contains normative commitments in
that they reflect the judgment of the person deciding how a person
with capacity would ideally act. 41 In many studies, researchers find
assessors unable to distinguish between decisions that indicate
incapacity and decisions that are merely unwise. 42 Indeed, many
disabled people have successfully argued that they had mental
capacity by attributing their decisions to other causes—for example,
religious beliefs or a “challenging personality.” 43 Empirical
research therefore suggests that decisions about whether someone
33

Id.
Id. at 82–84.
35
Id. at 84.
36
See BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 10, at 102.
37
Id.
38
See, supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See Lucy Series, supra note 12, at 82.
42
Id.
43
Id.
34
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lacks capacity are fraught and value-laden. 44
Moreover, guardianship atrophies mental capacity. 45 A
disabled person’s perceived best interest must therefore be balanced
against the evils of guardianship—which include diminished
“autonomy, individuality, self-esteem, and self-determination.” 46
Some scholars even suggest that guardianship treats someone’s
property as more closely tied to their best interest than personal
well-being. 47 People under guardianship frequently experience low
self-esteem, social isolation, and decreased health outcomes—even
when their guardianships are not abusive. 48
Put simply, capacity-based ideas of legal personality deny
people fundamental rights based on the idea that they lack capacity.
Instead of making their own decisions, people under guardianship
are subject to substituted decision-making. 49 The sections that
follow question the necessity and prudential value of substitute
decision-making, especially in legal representation.
B. Toward a Support-Based Model of Legal Personhood
Support-based models of legal personhood adopt a paradigm
of “universal legal capacity.” 50 The support-based model is
endorsed by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disability. 51 Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities concerns equal recognition before the law
and states: “States Parties shall recognize that persons with
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all
aspects of life.” 52 This Article represents a radical departure from
capacity-based models of personhood. Indeed, the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Committee clarified their
44

Id. at 87.
BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 10, at 102.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 102–03.
49
Id. at 132.
50
See Lucy Series, supra note 12, at 80.
51
Id. at 80–81.
52
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 12, ⁋ 2,
Mar. 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
https://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UUQ2-3QSB].
45

8

stance on equality before the law, jettisoning capacity-based
approaches to legal personhood altogether in a General Comment. 53
The 2014 General Comment clarifies the substance and
content of the above provision, noting that many States’ parties had
previously misunderstood it. 54 The Comment notes that disabled
peoples’ legal capacity is frequently denied by law; however, the
right to equal recognition implies universal legal capacity. 55 Legal
capacity and mental capacity are “distinct concepts.” 56 The
Comment therefore boldly declares that denying a person legal
capacity on the basis of their mental capacity is discrimination on
the basis of disability. 57 In the Comment, the Committee argues:
The concept of mental capacity is highly
controversial in and of itself. Mental capacity is not,
as is commonly presented, an objective, scientific
and naturally occurring phenomenon. Mental
capacity is contingent on social and political
contexts, as are the disciplines, professions and
practices which play a dominant role in assessing
mental capacity. 58
Two strands of argument run through this passage. First, the
Committee is rejecting mental capacity as an immutable fact.
Capacity is malleable. Second, because there is no objective way to
measure capacity, legal capacity might be arbitrarily denied to
persons on the basis of their perceived incapacity. Because disability
frequently serves as a proxy for mental capacity, discrimination on
the basis of disability is likely under a regime that considers mental
capacity to be a prerequisite to legal capacity.
A shift toward universal legal capacity means that
governments must not deny people legal capacity through
53
Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment
No. 1 on Art. 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/11/4
(Apr. 11, 2014), available at https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/031/20/PDF/G1403120.pdf?OpenElement
[hereinafter General Comment].
54
Id. ¶ 3.
55
Id. ¶ 8.
56
Id. ¶ 13.
57
Id. ¶ 28.
58
Id. ¶ 14.
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substituted decision-making. Substituted decision-making is any
system where:
(i) legal capacity is removed from a person, even if
this is in respect of a single decision; (ii) a substitute
decision-maker can be appointed by someone other
than the person concerned, and this can be done
against his or her will; and (iii) any decision made by
a substitute decision-maker is based on what is
believed to be in the objective “best interests” of the
person concerned, as opposed to being based on the
person’s own will and preferences. 59
Support-based paradigms avoid substituted decisionmaking by prioritizing the expressed preferences of disabled people
and supporting them in enacting those preferences. 60 Support may
be either formal or informal and may vary in intensity. 61 For some
people, support means peer support or advocacy by other disabled
people. 62 For other people, universal design and accessibility
measures might be necessary, meaning that institutions such as
banks might be required to provide information in accessible
formats—ranging from braille to more accessible language. 63
Regardless of form, support is intended to enable disabled
people to enact their express preferences. As the Committee
explains, “[t]his means that persons with disabilities must have the
opportunity to live independently in the community and to make
choices and to have control over their everyday lives, on an equal
basis with others . . . .” 64 The onus is therefore placed on institutions
like governments, courts, and financial institutions to rectify
structural injustices, rather than on the individual, to navigate
inaccessible services. Disabled people should not have to navigate
a world that is not designed for them—rather, universal design

59

Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 14.
61
Id. ¶ 17.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. ¶ 44.
60

10

ought to be incorporated at every step of the process.
C. The Current Status of Supported Decision-Making in
the United States
The United States has not ratified the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In 2014, the Senate voted on the
Treaty; however, the ratification effort fell five votes short. 65
Nonetheless, the National Council on Disability, an independent
federal agency comprising disability experts who advise on matters
of disability policy, compiled a report on the status of American
disability law in relation to the Convention. 66
The National Council on Disability identified substantial
gaps in U.S. law pertaining to disability. Regarding Article 12, the
Council notes that legal capacity is generally determined at the state
level. 67 When challenged, these state laws are subject to rational
basis tests per City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 68 Per
Cleburne, disability classifications are not suspect but rather need
only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 69
Because rational basis scrutiny requires only that disability law be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest, the Council
notes that courts rarely subject state guardianship laws to much
scrutiny. 70
Some commentators argue that the Americans with
Disabilities Act prohibits guardianship and substituted decision-

65

Josh Rogin, Senate GOP Rejects U.N. Disabilities Treaty, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Dec. 4, 2012), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/04/senate-gop-rejectsu-n-disabilities-treaty/ [https://perma.cc/S7LC-KAUS].
66
See generally NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, FINDING THE GAPS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISABILITY LAWS IN THE U.S. TO THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2008)
[hereinafter FINDING THE GAPS].
67
Id.
68
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (holding discriminatory zoning requirements prohibiting homes for
people with mental disabilities from building in an area were not rationally
related to a legitimate government interest).
69
Id. It is also noteworthy that Cleburne is one of the few instances
where disability discrimination has failed the rational basis test.
70
See FINDING THE GAPS, supra note 66 at art. 12.
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making via the Title II Olmstead mandate. 71 In Olmstead, the
Supreme Court held that the “unjustified placement or retention of
persons in institutions” is a form of disability discrimination. 72 The
Court further held that treatments and services for qualified
individuals with disabilities should be provided in settings “least
restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.” 73
Legal scholar, Leslie Salzman, uses the logic of Olmstead to
argue that guardianship itself is a form of disability discrimination
under the ADA. 74 The Olmstead Court concluded that the ADA
prohibits the unjustified segregation and isolation of disabled
people. 75 Guardianship of the person might be considered
unnecessarily isolating, as people’s decisions about when, where,
and with whom to socialize with are taken away. 76 Guardianship of
one’s estate may be viewed in a similar light. 77 Moreover,
guardianship is a state service or program and therefore is subject to
the Olmstead mandate. 78 Probate judges are not always informed
about their obligations under the ADA. 79 Salzman finds that judges
do not tend to enact less restrictive forms of guardianship even when
they are available. 80
Contrary to Salzman’s argument, however, the Olmstead
decision allows for guardianship in situations where the person is
deemed incapacitated. 81 Writing the opinion in Olmstead, J.
Ginsberg stated: “nothing in the ADA or its implementing
regulations condones termination of institutional settings for
persons unable to handle or benefit from community settings.” 82
The Olmstead mandate applies only to “qualified” individuals with
disabilities, which means a person must meet eligibility
71

See, e.g., Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):
Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title
II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 U. COL. L. REV. 158 (2010).
72
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
73
Id. at 599.
74
Salzman, supra note 71, at 162.
75
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587.
76
Salzman, supra note 71, at 188.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See id. at 175.
80
Id.
81
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601.
82
Id.
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requirements for the receipt of services in community settings as
determined by a medical professional. 83 Therefore, being deemed
incapacitated by a medical professional (something that often
happens prior to guardianship hearings) is likely to justify
guardianship under existing federal law.
Nonetheless, supported decision-making is gaining traction.
By 2018, nineteen states had passed versions of the Uniform
Guardianship, Conservatorship, and Other Protective Arrangements
Act (UGCOPAA). 84 The Uniform Act makes guardianship a last
resort 85 and provides due process to people involved in
guardianship hearings. 86 The Uniform Act would bring state laws in
line with the demands of disability advocates. The disability
community has strongly argued for solutions that transcend
guardianship. 87 That said, the Uniform Act is not the law of the land
by any means. For example, the last time that sixteen states revised
their guardianship statutes was before the Reagan administration. 88
Supported decision-making regimes are growing in
popularity and gaining traction internationally. 89 Supported
decision-making eschews substituted decision-making for a model
that prioritizes disabled people’s expressed preferences. 90
Supported decision-making models enable disabled people to live
independent, self-determined lives that would not be possible under
guardianship. 91 Nonetheless, U.S. laws and norms, especially
regarding the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers, do
83

Id.
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROTECTIVE
ARRANGEMENTS ACT: SUMMARY (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017),
https://www.guardianship.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/UGCOPAASummary-Oct-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZU5-JRCQ] (last visited Sept. 30,
2021).
85
Id. § 302(b)(4).
86
See id.
87
See, e.g., BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 10, at 4.
88
Benjamin Orzeske & Diana Noel, Uniform Guardianship,
Conservatorship, and Other Protective Arrangements Act, Presentation at the
National Conference on Guardianship (October 20-23, 2018),
https://www.guardianship.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/UGCOPPAAct_presentation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6E5F-2GG4].
89
See id. at Subsection II.B.
90
Id.
91
Id.
84
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not prioritize self-determination for disabled clients. 92 The section
that follows outlines the ways in which the Model Rules undermine
disabled clients’ ability to interact with their attorneys on an equal
basis.
III.

THE ETHICAL ATTORNEY AND THE “INCOMPETENT” CLIENT

Returning to the case of Britney Spears, Britney Spears
acquired a new attorney. 93 However, that attorney’s hands might
have been tied regarding the dissolution of her guardianship. If he
deemed her to have “diminished capacity,” the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct would have required him to act in Britney’s
perceived best interest rather than respect her wishes. 94 The ethical
rules that bind attorneys frequently conflict with the selfdetermination and independence of clients with “diminished
capacity.” Although ethical rules vary by state, this paper concerns
itself with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. This section
discusses some of the ways in which rules of professional conduct
fail to comport with the shift toward supported decision-making
within the disability rights community and international examples
of best practice.
A. Model Rule 1.14: Client with Diminished Capacity
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14(a) requires
lawyers to maintain normal lawyer-client relationships “as far as
reasonably possible” 95 when dealing with clients. Presumptively,
clients are to be treated as capable of making their own decisions
per the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 96 However, Rule
1.14(b) makes a series of exceptions for clients who suffer from “a
diminished mental capacity.” 97 Per the Comment accompanying
Rule 1.14, “severely incapacitated person[s]” 98 may not have any

92

See id. at Part III.
See Coscarelli, supra note 6.
94
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
95
Id. § 1.14(a).
96
Id.
97
Id. § 1.14(b).
98
“Severely incapacitated person” is not defined by Model Rule 1.14.
93

14

power to make legally-binding decisions. 99 Nonetheless, lawyers
are required to take into account all clients’ preferences to the extent
that they can have weight in legal proceedings. 100 The Comment
likens incapacitated clients to children in custody proceedings who
might have a preference regarding where to live that ought to be
taken into account. 101
While the Model Rules require disabled people to be treated
with “attention and respect” 102 and to “accord the represented
person the status of client,” 103 the relationship between the Rules
and capacity has been fraught. Rule 1.14 outlines three situations in
which lawyers may make decisions for their clients. First, if the
client has diminished capacity, and a lawyer has reason to believe
that the client is at risk of substantial harm unless they act, the
lawyer can and ought to take protective action. 104 Second, a lawyer
may disclose a client’s condition in an attempt to seek the
appointment of a legal representative such as a guardian. 105 Finally,
in emergency situations where a client is in danger of “imminent
and irreparable harm,” a lawyer may take action even if that person
has not established an attorney-client relationship. 106 It is important
to note that these exceptions apply only if a client is deemed to have
diminished capacity. Therefore, the Model Rules arguably only
justify substituted decision-making for disabled people. 107 Yet, the
rules provide little guidance to attorneys who might have
preconceived ideas of their client’s “best interests” and their ethical
obligations to further those interests.
The American Bar Association recognizes that capacity is
fluid, that our understandings of capacity are evolving, and that
recent legal developments call the term capacity itself into
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question. 108 Writing for the Commission on Law and Aging,
Sabatino and Wood discuss how the ABA recognizes that substitute
decision-making may diminish clients’ capabilities further, enforce
a singular standard for capacity, and lead lawyers to err in making
decisions for their clients. 109 However, instead of jettisoning the
problematic category of mental capacity, Sabatino and Wood argue
for a “big picture” approach that asks whether a client has the
capacity to make a certain decision. 110 While this is undoubtedly a
step in the right direction, this approach still relies on problematic
and variable ideas about mental capacity to take away the autonomy
of disabled people. People with impairments that diminish mental
capacity are part of the disability community, either by function of
a permanent or disability or age-related impairments. The Model
Rules only question the ability of clients with diminished capacity
to make decisions—meaning that the same decisions made by nondisabled persons would not be subject to the lawyer’s scrutiny. 111
This double standard creates potential for ableist lawyers to deny
their clients’ capacities to make legal decisions. Because the
attorney is the arbiter of their clients’ capacities, and lawyers are not
immune to bias, allowing lawyers to exert this type of power over
their clients’ risks denying people the fundamental right to adequate
counsel.
However, even if an attorney did not intend to be ableist, the
Model Rules create an “ethical minefield” for even the most
sympathetic attorneys. 112 The following section discusses some of
the ethical challenges inherent to representing disabled clients.
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B. Navigating the “Ethical Minefield:” Representing
Disabled Clients
Representing clients with diminished capacity presents
attorneys with an “ethical minefield” under the Model Rules. 113
Dlugacz and Wimmer outline a hypothetical to demonstrate the
potential problems that arise during such representation. 114 Ms. X is
sixty-eight and lives in a one-bedroom apartment. She has no
children but has an estranged half-brother and other family
members. 115 She was diagnosed with schizophrenia and paranoia
but developed severe reactions to the medication prescribed by her
doctor. 116 Due to the reactions, Ms. X ceased taking her medication
and does not view herself to be mentally disabled. 117
Recently, Ms. X’s apartment has become dilapidated. 118 Her
electricity is frequently cut off due to failure to pay her bills. 119 She
was referred to the City’s Adult Protective Services (APS) by her
neighbors. 120 As of late, she is the subject of guardianship
proceedings because she is engaging in hoarding behaviors and
failing to take her medicine or consult with her psychiatrist. 121 Ms.
X hired an attorney to oppose her guardianship proceedings—what
are her attorney’s ethical obligations? 122 The Model Rules would
require that Ms. X’s attorney consider whether she has diminished
capacity. 123 Her attorney would likely find that she has diminished
capacity due to her diagnosis of schizophrenia and paranoia.
Therefore, under Model Rule 1.14, Ms. X’s attorney would be faced
with a dilemma. 124 Should the attorney zealously represent Ms. X’s
stated preference of not being placed under guardianship or
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substitute their judgment for that of Ms. X?
Dlugacz and Wimmer outline a four-part normative
framework that solves this problem. 125 However, it differs from the
model prescribed by Rule 1.14. Dlugacz and Wimmer argue that:
(1) autonomy should be paramount; (2) attorneys should respect the
choices of competent clients; (3) when a client’s capacity is limited,
the attorney should only intervene in the short-term to facilitate
autonomy in the long-term; (4) attorneys should constantly doubt
their determinations. 126 These principles are similar to but
distinguishable from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, per
the authors’ admission. 127
First, the Model Rules adopt a means-end distinction. 128
Clients are to decide the ends of representation, whereas the
attorney can generally decide the means of achieving those goals. 129
However, the means-end distinction is not always congruent with
autonomy and may make even representation more difficult. 130 For
example, a client experiencing paranoia may suspect her attorney of
undermining her if the attorney makes decisions without including
her. 131 Ideally, to preserve autonomy, clients ought to be consulted
tactically to the extent practicable. 132 Yet, the Model Rules do not
currently require this.
Moreover, commentators note that determining whether a
client has diminished capacity is difficult. As noted earlier, the lines
between unwise and incapacitous 133 decisions are often blurred. 134
An attorney representing Ms. X, for example, may view her
hoarding behaviors as evidence of limited capacity, whereas she
might simply be a person who enjoys living in cluttered spaces. 135
Attorneys representing disabled clients must be careful not to
project their own ideas about their client’s best interest onto the
situation when determining whether they have diminished capacity.
125
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As argued previously, judgments about whether someone is
incapacitated frequently confuse the ideas of capacity and wisdom,
leaving disabled people unable to make decisions their attorneys
deem to be “unwise.” 136 Rule 1.14 allows for substitute decisionmaking when attorneys believe their client to have “diminished
capacity,” giving attorneys significant latitude to substitute their
judgment for that of their clients’. The concentration of power in the
hands of the attorney rather than the client risks undermining
clients’ autonomy in significant ways.
The Model Rules give attorneys confusing guidance when
they are representing people in guardianship hearings. For example,
should an attorney zealously represent their client in their pursuit to
avoid guardianship? Or should they substitute their judgment about
their client’s best interests in the face of perceived harm? As
discussed in Part II.C, many states’ guardianship laws do not require
guardianship to be the least restrictive alternative, and many of these
statutes have not been updated since at least the 1980s. 137 Therefore,
attorneys representing clients in this context must advocate for their
clients’ autonomy more aggressively than they might need to if
these statutes were in line with current best practices. Yet, the Model
Rules might suggest that these clients’ expressed preferences should
not be zealously represented in situations when the attorney
perceives that the client might be in harm’s way. 138
Even in the most progressive states, attorneys defending
against a guardianship proceeding have conflicting obligations to
their clients. Attorneys are required to promote the interest their
client seeks—frequently avoiding guardianship altogether.
However, they also must keep clients with diminished capacities’
best interest in mind 139—hence, the “ethical minefield” discussed
above.
As Dlugacz and Wimmer note, what seems good to a client
at any given moment may not be the action that facilitates long-term
136
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autonomy interests. 140 However, this paper argues that attorneys
ought to exercise caution when making decisions that go against
their clients’ expressed preferences, especially during guardianship
proceedings. Nonetheless, Dlugacz and Wimmer rightfully note that
the current rules create ethical conundrums for attorneys
representing their clients in guardianship hearings. 141
It is particularly problematic that attorneys who are
representing disabled clients in guardianship hearings are given
conflicting advice. Guardianship hearings are a situation where
clients need zealous representation to promote due process and
prevent injustice. Most guardianships are permanent. 142 Moreover,
courts routinely fail to take advantage of less restrictive alternatives.
The National Council on Disability’s study found that ninety-four
percent of guardianship positions are granted, and few put any form
of limitation on the guardian’s authority. 143 The stakes are therefore
high for clients facing a guardianship proceeding.
However, it is difficult for attorneys to zealously defend
their clients’ long-term interests in maintaining their autonomy
during guardianship hearings while adhering to the Model Rules.
The Model Rules would have attorneys be complicit in stripping
their clients’ autonomy when they think it is in their client’s best
interest. 144 Yet, the Model Rules do not instruct attorneys about
resolving conflicts between short-term harm prevention and longterm consequences like the loss of autonomy through guardianship.
Section C discusses how the lack of access to attorneys in
guardianship proceedings further complicates this issue.
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C. Lack of Access to Attorneys
The plight of disabled people seeking to avoid unnecessary
paternalism is exacerbated by the unavailability of counsel in
guardianship proceedings. Guardianship creates a form of “civil
death”—a person frequently loses their right to hold property,
manage their affairs, and even vote. 145 Nevertheless, some states do
not even allow counsel in guardianship hearings. 146 Even where
attorneys are allowed, it is uncommon for people facing
guardianship proceedings to have access to counsel. According to a
national study of guardianship hearings, only one-third of people
are represented by attorneys in guardianship hearings. 147 Most
guardianship hearings last less than fifteen minutes, and twenty-five
percent of hearings last less than five minutes. 148
Even in states that recognize that disabled people have the
right to counsel in guardianship proceedings, attorneys do not
always zealously represent their clients because of conflicts in
ethical rules. 149 The right to counsel may even be qualified in some
circumstances. For example, some states allow courts to appoint
attorneys or require the person subject to guardianship proceedings
to bear the burden of legal and expert fees associated with
challenging their status. 150 The lack of access to attorneys creates a
system in which people under guardianship are unaware of their
rights, as Britney Spears was. 151 Moreover, it creates a fertile
ground for due process violations.
Even though due process violations are rampant in
guardianship proceedings, federal courts will generally not accept
appeals to ongoing guardianship cases. 152 Because there is no right
to appeal, or even have counsel who zealously promotes disabled
clients’ interests, well-intending lawyers may trap their clients into
permanent guardianships by substituting their own opinions about
the disabled person’s temporary best interest for the expressed
145
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preference of the disabled person. 153 Given the exigencies of the
current system, the Model Rules ought to take a firmer stance on the
autonomy of disabled clients in guardianship proceedings— the
system is already stacked against them. Section IV proposes
changes to the language of Rule 1.14 to facilitate this shift.
IV.

IMPLEMENTING SUPPORT THROUGH CHANGING MODEL RULE
1.14

As discussed throughout this paper, the law imposes a
double standard on the representation of disabled clients that does
not apply to non-disabled clients. Non-disabled clients enabled to
behave wantonly, without regard to their own best interest, and
attorneys have little recourse to intervene in these situations. 154
Yet, disabled people are routinely subject to substitute decisionmaking regimes, and the Model Rules reinforce the idea that
substitute decision-making is acceptable.
This paper suggests that legally binding, formalized
supported decision-making agreements between lawyers and their
clients ought to be implemented. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct should require such agreements. Creating contractual
boundaries between attorneys and prospective clients would
clarify the parameters of attorney intervention and allow attorneys
to zealously pursue their client’s best interest and expressed
preferences simultaneously.
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A. What Should Supported Decision-Making Look Like?
Supported decision-making puts the person with a disability
in charge of their own decisions. 155 Supported decision-making
arrangements vary in degrees of formality and explicitness;
however, such agreements involve people selecting trusted advisors
to serve as “supporters.” 156 Supporters agree to help disabled people
understand, consider, and communicate their decisions—but the
ultimate decision-making authority rests with the disabled
person. 157 Attorneys are arguably in an ideal position to serve as
supporters. They are people with whom clients develop confidence
and are able to provide advice regarding outcomes. An attorney can
help disabled people understand the ramifications of their decisions,
make their decisions, and communicate and enact their decisions
through legal processes.
Support may take a variety of forms but generally includes
tools such as plain language explanations, time to discuss choices,
helping the disabled person create pro-con lists, role-playing
activities to understand choices, bringing supporters to important
appointments to help the person remember, record, and discuss their
options, and other necessary steps. 158
Some states create formalized contracts between supporters
and disabled people. For example, Texas allows people with
disabilities to sign formal, legally binding documents allowing
supporters to take certain actions on their behalf while setting
restrictions on what the supporter may do and how they take
action. 159 The Texas form consists of a checklist that states the scope
of support—for example, can the supporter help the disabled person
in obtaining food, clothing, and shelter? 160 However, the contract
also emphasizes that supporters are not allowed to make decisions
155
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for people who seek these arrangements. 161 Instead, supporters are
limited to helping people access information, understand their
options, and communicate their preferences to others. 162 The
explicit documentation helps ensure that supporters do not overstep
their boundaries and creates meaningful expectations on both sides
of a partnership. This paper proposes that the Model Rules and
corresponding commentary should be changed to encourage the
creation of formalized supported decision-making agreements. 163
Texas could serve as a model for how this should be carried out. 164
Making supportive agreements legally binding and part of
forming the attorney-client relationship would be an important step
toward ensuring zealous representation of clients with disabilities.
Attorneys who sign such agreements may be less likely to support
autonomy-stripping measures such as guardianship for their clients.
B. What About People Who are “Too Impaired”?
A common concern about supported decision-making is that
some people are “too impaired” to benefit from supported decisionmaking. Severely cognitively impaired people might be subject to
manipulation by family members and other people seeking to
control their assets. Therefore, lawyers must act to prevent such
individuals from suffering grave harm. The Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Committee shares this fear,
stating that a balance must be struck between preventing undue
influence and respecting expressed preferences. 165
Undue influence certainly raises concerns to which lawyers
should be attuned, and cognitively disabled people, in particular, are
likely to be subjected to undue influence. 166 Yet, on some level, the
161
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critiques of mental capacity raised in Subsection II.B still remain
true. First, it is incredibly difficult to determine whether someone is
deciding to do something because they are incapacitated or merely
unwise. 167 The law does not prevent the latter category of decisionmaking for anyone but disabled persons. 168 A lawyer may also
interject their own perspectives on capacity when deciding whether
their client lacks capacity— such as a lawyer who enjoys clean
spaces thinking Ms. X was incompetent because she kept her house
in disarray. 169 To some extent, disabled people’s decision-making is
held to a far more stringent standard than non-disabled people—
they may face more pressure to make the “right” decision. However,
making mistakes, even grievous ones, is allowed for all other
categories of citizens. Presuming that disabled people cannot make
decisions for themselves often creates “self-fulfilling prophesies”
where their decision-making abilities atrophy. 170
Although attorneys are arguably in the best position to
recognize undue influence, they must constantly scrutinize their
own impressions. 171 Oftentimes, attorneys might be more likely to
perceive undue influence where it does not exist due to their own
implicit biases.
Fundamentally, the argument that certain people are simply
too impaired to make their own decisions ignores the ways in which
society is set up to keep people from making autonomous decisions.
For example, disabled people are frequently placed in institutional
settings where their behavior is heavily monitored. 172 Twenty-three
percent of individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities lived in large congregate care facilities in 2016. 173 This
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has been shown to atrophy decision-making capacities. 174 Yet, the
Pennhurst Longitudinal Study, which examined adults with every
category of disability, revealed that previously institutionalized
individuals (even those with “severe” impairments) thrive in their
communities when given the appropriate supports. 175
The fact that capacity is malleable, capacity is difficult to
measure, and that support actually enables people to live
autonomously should give lawyers serious pause. The Model Rules
presume that clients with diminished capacity ought to be held to a
different standard than non-disabled clients. This paper suggests
otherwise. Disabled people can and do make their own decisions in
a variety of settings, and supportive arrangements can assist people
in making those decisions autonomously. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, specifically section 1.14, should be modified
to support lawyers in representing clients who are far too frequently
subjected to substitute decision-making models. Disabled clients
should be involved in their own representation to the same extent as
other clients.
C. Proposed Language
This paper proposes that the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct be changed to bring them in line with international norms
and identifies best practices within the disability community. The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities provides a
model for how this could work. 176 Currently, Model Rule 1.14
reads:
(a) When a client’s capacity to make adequately considered
decisions in connection with a representation is diminished,
whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some
other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible,
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has
diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical,
174
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financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot
adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer may
take reasonably necessary protective action, including
consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability
to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases,
seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator
or guardian.
(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with
diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking
protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is
impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal
information about the client, but only to the extent
reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests. 177
This paper proposes amending Rule 1.14 to read:
(a) A lawyer shall maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with a client irrespective of their
mental capacity. If a lawyer believes that a client
needs additional support to develop or
communicate their preferences, the lawyer and
client shall institute a supported decision-making
agreement that outlines the scope and contours
of the lawyer’s representation.
(b) A client’s expressed interests are to be respected,
irrespective of a lawyer’s views regarding
whether their decisions are wise. If the lawyer
believes that the client is in serious risk of
substantial physical, financial, or other harm or
acting under the undue influence of another, the
lawyer is authorized to express these opinions
and provide the client with information in an
accessible manner about their options. The
ultimate decision-making authority rests with the
client.
(c) A lawyer shall maintain a client’s confidences,
irrespective of their mental capacity.
(d) When a client’s expressed preferences cannot be
177
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ascertained, a lawyer shall act in the way that
best preserves their client’s long-term interest in
autonomy.
(e) A lawyer shall zealously represent the client’s
interests, irrespective of the client’s perceived or
actual mental capacity.
This wording would constitute a radical revision of Rule
1.14. However, such revision is necessary to ensure that the rights
of disabled people are zealously protected by their lawyers. The
proposed language creates an affirmative obligation on the part of
attorneys to institute supported decision-making agreements with
their clients. No doubt, this proposal will face objections from wellintentioned people afraid of disabled people putting themselves in
precarious situations. Disabled clients may not make decisions that
comport with their attorney’s judgment; however, it is vital that they
be allowed to do so. However, disabled people should be allowed to
make the full range of decisions available to non-disabled people,
including the ability to make bad decisions. To act otherwise has the
tendency to value disabled people’s property over their
personhood. 178
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V.

HYPOTHETICALS

At this point, professional responsibility professors would
likely bring up several hypotheticals in response to this paper’s
proposed solution. Supported decision-making, it might be argued,
is good in theory but rarely in practice. This paper seeks to refute
the logic underlying these types of hypothetical (and actual)
scenarios in what follows.
A. “The Unabomber”
Theodore Kaczynski committed several heinous atrocities
and evaded capture for more than a decade. 179 He was a highly
intelligent person with higher-than-average functional capacities. 180
However, evidence suggested that Kaczynski was mentally ill. 181
He was highly paranoid and, according to some accounts, was
schizophrenic. 182 His attorneys thought that an insanity defense
would be difficult to prove and instead felt like his strongest defense
was that he was mentally incapacitated. 183 Proof of incapacity
would have negated mens rea and also could be used as a mitigating
factor during sentencing. 184 Given that Kaczynski faced severe
penalties up to the death penalty, his legal counsel thought that
avoiding the death penalty should be the primary goal at trial. 185
However, Kaczynski did not view himself as insane. 186 He
objected to his lawyers’ characterization of his mental status and
thought that examination by a mental health professional would
invade his privacy in an unacceptable manner. 187 He moreover
believed that a mental health diagnosis would be personally
repugnant—he could not bear being deemed a “sickie.” 188 Even
though Kaczynski agreed with his legal team’s assessment of the
179
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defenses available to him, he preferred to risk the death penalty
instead of submitting to the humiliation of a public probe into his
mental health status. 189
Kaczynski’s decision created an ethical dilemma for his
attorneys. Should they violate their obligation of loyalty to their
client, or should they maintain loyalty, knowing that it would inhibit
their opportunity to zealously defend their client’s interests? 190
Kaczynski exhibited signs of competence—he had lived in the
world, was highly intelligent, and had evaded capture for years. 191
His views were pathological, but it was unclear that they were the
result of lapses in reason. 192 His legal counsel could accept
Kaczynski’s right to make a decision that by all accounts was
unreasonable, unwise, and would likely lead to his death, or they
could have him deemed incapacitated by the court and potentially
save his life. 193 Kaczynski’s lawyers (after several court-appointed
changes) ultimately went against his wishes, and the judge denied
Kaczynski’s motion to represent himself. 194
What would the Model Rules say about Kaczynski’s
situation? What would support-based models say? Kaczynski’s
lawyers likely acted in accordance with the Model Rules, even
though Rule 1.14’s guidance is exceedingly unclear. The lawyers
perceived that Kaczynski’s capacity was diminished by way of his
mental health condition and that he was at risk of “substantial
physical, financial or other harm” in the absence of their actions. 195
However, Kaczynski’s lawyers not only violated their client’s trust;
they violated Kaczynski’s self-determination. It is highly possible
and probable that Kaczynski viewed death to be a more desirable
option than, e.g., life in a mental health institution. While there is
some discomfort associated with letting clients make bad decisions,
to some extent, attorneys must allow their clients to do so. For
example, clients are perfectly entitled to reject reasonable
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settlement offers in the face of a riskier trial. 196 The consequences
are less grievous; however, the point stands that the Model Rules
generally allow clients wide latitude to make bad decisions—unless
they are disabled. This paper’s proposed language merely seeks to
make the Model Rules’ treatment of disabled persons congruent
with its treatment of non-disabled persons.
The support-based model of personhood would argue that
Kaczynski has a right to decide which outcome he prefers. 197
Although Kaczynski’s logic seems foreign or even unthinkable to
many, it is his prerogative to make his own decisions regarding the
ends of representation. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2
emphasizes that clients have control over the “objectives” of
litigation. 198 At the very least, Kaczynski should be entitled to make
that decision. However, as other parts of this paper assert, arguments
exist for allowing clients to be more involved in strategy beyond
merely stating their preferences.
Had Kaczynski’s lawyers treated him as a co-equal
participant in his criminal proceedings, perhaps, Kaczynski’s
paranoid tendencies might have quelled somewhat. While it would
be onerous and unnecessary to solicit Kaczynski’s input about every
decision or motion filed, disabled clients such as Kaczynski ought
to be able to dictate strategy where such strategy affects their lives
in significant ways. Although Kaczynski’s decision is not the
decision most people would make, this was also not his attorneys’
decision to make.
If Kaczynski’s attorneys had followed the proposed
framework, they would have maintained a normal attorney-client
relationship with Kaczynski. They would have respected his
preference to go to trial, even though they thought it would be
unwise. Although this might seem to be an unpalatable outcome to
some, allowing disabled clients to make these types of decisions is
necessary to preserve autonomy and avoid discriminating against
disabled clients.
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B. Sesha Kittay
Sesha Kittay is the severely disabled daughter of a leading
disability scholar and philosophy professor, Eva Feder Kittay. 199
Sesha does not communicate verbally, and she cannot walk. 200
According to doctors, she has “no measurable IQ.” 201 According to
her mother, Sesha needs continuous care and cannot be left alone. 202
Sesha currently resides in a care home. 203 In Eva Kittay’s words,
“no accommodations, anti-discrimination laws, or guarantees of
equal opportunity can make [Sesha] self-supporting or
independent.” 204
Sesha seems to be a prime candidate for guardianship. She
is unable to communicate her decisions verbally, and she lacks the
capacity to make reasoned decisions. 205 One might think that the
Model Rules are appropriate in cases such as Sesha’s. However, this
paper argues that even people who are profoundly incapacitated
could benefit from a change in the model rules that clarifies
attorneys’ roles in guardianship proceedings.
First, it is important to note that Sesha’s case is atypical
rather than the norm. Most disabled people can communicate their
preferences in one way or another, as evidenced by formerly
institutionalized persons’ abilities to integrate into their
communities when provided with proper support. 206 Second, there
is likely a disconnect between the interests of a client like Sesha’s
and the interests of her prospective guardians. A diligent attorney
ought to be attuned to such conflicts. Attorneys must constantly be
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reminded that they are tasked with pursuing their clients’ interests
rather than the interests of the guardians and that working with
guardians may undercut important avenues of self-determination for
their clients. 207 For example, while many guardians might favor a
more hands-on approach advocating in their ward’s perceived best
interest, supportive decision-making would consider Sesha’s
preferences. A client like Sesha may not be able to convey those
preferences verbally. Nonetheless, attorneys can look for other clues
to intuit the decisions Sesha might make for herself.
Indeed, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Committee foresaw this issue when drafting the General
Comment on Article 12. 208 The Comment implies that professionals
working with the disability community ought to be attuned to
“diverse, non-conventional methods of communication, especially
for those who use non-verbal forms of communication to express
their will and preferences.” 209 For example, Sesha might not
verbally communicate her desires and may not fully understand the
goals of litigation and its consequences. However, that does not
mean she cannot communicate her preferences in other ways—she
may simply communicate them in a way that most attorneys are not
trained to understand. For instance, Sesha might express a
preference for a preferred living arrangement through non-verbal
behaviors. The support-based paradigm would require attorneys’
due diligence to how non-verbal clients express their desires and
preferences. 210
Moreover, the proposed rule language offers an important
corrective by instituting a presumption in favor of measures that
preserve long-term autonomy when a client cannot communicate
their expressed preferences. 211 Guidance about autonomy should be
consistent with the lived experiences of disabled persons, paying
particular attention to any tendency to undermine their ability to live
independently in the community. Historically, disabled people have
been forcibly segregated from their communities. 212 In other words,
I have suggested that a presumption in favor of integrating people
207

See generally BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 10.
General Comment, supra note 53, at ¶ 17.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
See supra, Section IV.C.
212
See generally DOWNEY & CONROY, supra note 14.
208

33

into their communities while providing adequate supports can
enhance long-term autonomy. 213 I also argue that most, if not all,
disabled people, irrespective of the severity of their disabilities, can
benefit from being given varying degrees of independence and
community integration. 214 The Pennhurst Longitudinal Study—
showing that previously institutionalized persons studied benefitted
from community integration when provided with adequate
supports—regardless of the severity of their disabilities supports
this conclusion. 215 By treating autonomy and independence as
legally cognizable interests that clients with diminished capacity
possess, lawyers will be less likely to promote solutions like
guardianship that unnecessarily strip people of their autonomy.
In cases like Sesha’s, the proposed rule changes to Part IV.C
would provide three distinct benefits. First, the proposed rule would
clarify that the lawyer’s duty is to the client—that they should not
cooperate with family members seeking overly restrictive forms of
guardianship that would not enhance the disabled person’s longterm interest in autonomy. Second, the proposed rule would require
lawyers to do due diligence to determine their clients’ preferences.
For example, since people do not share the same preferences—a
shrewd attorney should know whether the client would rather live
with other disabled people or prefer to live a life integrated in her
community. Finally, in cases where clients truly cannot decide the
aims of litigation for themselves, the proposed rule would make
preservation of autonomy the default, as opposed to historically
restrictive guardianship arrangements. This change is important
given the historical tendency to view capacity as fixed rather than
malleable, thereby unnecessarily stripping disabled people of their
autonomy.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Under the status quo, representing disabled clients in
guardianship hearings presents an ethical minefield for lawyers.
Lawyers are frequently called upon to substitute their ideas of what
is best for their clients for what their clients want. The Model Rules
do not provide sufficient guidance to attorneys facing these
dilemmas. Nor do the Model Rules protect the long-term autonomy
of disabled people. Indeed, one might argue that it is impossible for
an attorney to zealously represent their client’s interest in a
guardianship proceeding if they disagree with their client’s position.
These ambiguities perpetuate an unjust system in which disabled
people are often needlessly stripped of their self-determination and
independence.
This paper proposes a new language for Model Rule 1.14.
Instead of treating diminished capacity as an excuse for lawyers to
override their clients’ preferences, the proposed language requires
lawyers to attend to their clients’ expressed preferences. Next, this
Model Rules give disabled people the right to set the terms of their
representation in line with supported decision-making contracts
proven effective in places like Texas and British Columbia. 216
Finally, the proposed Model Rule provides clarity in cases where
clients cannot clearly express their preferences. The proposed rule
implements a presumption toward enhancing the client’s long-term
autonomy—an important corrective to the historical tendency to
needlessly strip disabled clients of their autonomy. In these ways,
the proposed rule is sensitive to the concerns of the disability
community while also clarifying the duties of lawyers to their
disabled clients.
In the case of Britney Spears, the proposed changes to
Model Rule 1.14 would have clarified her attorney’s ethical
obligations to her. Her stated preference was that her guardianship
be terminated. 217 The justice system should be designed so that she
would receive zealous representation in the adversarial context that
determined whether she was free to live the life she chooses,
regardless of her attorney’s perception of her capacity. Nonetheless,
the implications of the #FreeBritney movement reach beyond
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Britney Spears herself—all too frequently, disabled people
experience the injustices of the guardianship system without the
platform that Britney has to change her circumstances. This paper
argues that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct be brought in
line with best practice endorsed by the disability community. Doing
so would not only have freed Britney but would also ensure that
other disabled people receive the same opportunity to make their
own decisions.
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